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In the economic literature on market competition, ﬁrms are often modeled as
single decision makers and the internal organization of the ﬁrm is neglected (unitary
player assumption). However, as the literature on strategic delegation suggests, one
can not generally expect that the behavior of teams is equivalent to the behavior
of individuals in Cournot competition. Nevertheless, there are models of team-
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a theoretical foundation for the unitary player assumption in Cournot competition.
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In the economic literature on market competition such as Bertrand or Cournot compe-
tition, ﬁrms are modeled as single decision makers and the internal organization of the
ﬁrm is neglected. This is known as the unitary player assumption. In contrast, studies
of the theory of the ﬁrm (e.g. Hart, 1995) and personnel economics (e.g. Lazear, 1995,
Prendergast, 1999) focus extensively on the internal organization of the ﬁrm but the
market environment is often neglected. In quantity competition a l` a Cournot, teams do
not generally display the same behavior as individuals. Strategic delegation of a princi-
pal to a manager in Cournot oligopoly leads to revenue maximization of the ﬁrm rather
than proﬁt maximization (see Vickers, 1985, Fershtman and Judd, 1987). This example
shows that the behavior of the ﬁrm depends crucially on the model of interaction within
the team/ﬁrm. Thus from a theoretical point of view, the unitary player assumption in
Cournot competition must be questioned. However, there exist models of ﬁrm organi-
zation generating behavior equivalent to a single decision maker providing a theoretical
foundation of the unitary player assumption in the Cournot oligopoly. For example, we
consider a Cournot oligopoly where members of each ﬁrm choose eﬀorts. For simplicity,
the eﬀorts of the members in each ﬁrm are aggregated additively to the quantity of the
ﬁrm (see also Nabantian and Schotter, 1997). We consider two diﬀerent regimes of dis-
tributing the ﬁrm’s proﬁts among its members. First, proﬁts may be distributed equally
per head, an arrangement that may correspond loosely to a co-operative like a Kibbutz.
Second, proﬁts may be distributed proportionally according to the member’s eﬀort and
each member’s eﬀort is costly. In both cases the Nash equilibrium quantities of the ﬁrms
are equivalent to the Nash equilibrium in an analog Cournot oligopoly in which each ﬁrm
is a single decision maker. The question is whether there is also empirical evidence for
such behavioral equivalence. We study experimentally this behavioral equivalence and
ﬁnd support for the unitary player assumption in Cournot competition.
Our work is in direct contrast to recent experimental results on price competition be-
1tween teams. Bornstein and Gneezy (2002) and Bornstein, Budescu, and Kugler (2002)
test the unitary player assumption in Bertrand duopoly. In these studies, the organi-
zations of the ﬁrms are analog to ours. However, instead the aggregation of eﬀorts to
quantities, individual prices are aggregated additively to the ﬁrm’s price. They reject
the unitary player assumption in price competition between teams.
An early experimental study investigating quantity competition between ﬁrms con-
sisting each of a group of subjects is Sauermann and Selten (1959). In this study, the
internal structure of the ﬁrm is rather complex aiming at replicating a “realistic” decision
environment. In contrast, we want to have more control over the internal organization
of the ﬁrm, i.e., the aggregation of decisions and the the distribution of proﬁts. The
design of our experiment is related to experiments on Cournot competition, in particular
with regard to the number of ﬁrms, the time horizon, the feedback information between
rounds, the ﬁxed matching scheme, and the computational support available to subjects
(see for example Dolbear et al., 1968, Huck, Normann, and Oechssler, 1999, 2000, 2004,
Huck et al., 2002, Huck, M¨ uller, and Normann, 2001, and Siegel and Castellan, 1963; for
a recent survey see Huck, 2002).
Our study relates to the growing literature studying the diﬀerence between decisions
taken by teams and individuals. Nabantian and Schotter (1997) examine the inﬂuence
of diﬀerent incentive schemes on team production, among them also the distribution of
proﬁts per head as well as proportional distribution. As in our design, they aggregate
decisions of subjects inside the ﬁrm additively. However, their study is restricted to a
monopoly.
Bornstein and Erev (1994), Bornstein, Erev, and Rosen (1990), Erev, Bornstein, and
Galili (1993), Bornstein, Gneezy, and Nagel (2003) as well as Rapoport and Bornstein
(1989) all investigate the eﬀect of intragroup competition with regard to two famous
problems of social interaction, namely the co-ordination problem and the free-riding
problem. One ﬁnding is that competition between teams may ease some of the well
known social dilemmas like contributions to a public good. Work by Insko et al. (1994),
2Bornstein, Budescu, and Zamir (1997), Bornstein and Ben-Yossef (1994), and Schopler
and Insko (1992) focuses on testing the unitary player assumption in other games than
Cournot oligopoly.
The article is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces in detail the experimental
design. The hypotheses are presented in Section 3. All results are described in Section
4. We conclude with a discussion in Section 5. The instructions to the subjects are given
in the Appendix.
2 Design
Our model of market competition is a symmetric 3-ﬁrm Cournot oligopoly1 with linear
demand and costs. Every ﬁrm faces the inverse demand function






j=1 qj is the sum of all ﬁrm’s quantities qj ∈ R, j = 1,...,3. Each ﬁrm
has unit marginal costs, i.e. c(qj) = qj. The proﬁt function of each ﬁrm j = 1,2,3 is
given by
πj(qj,q−j) = (p(Q) − 1)qj, (2)
whereby q−j =
P
k6=j qk is the sum of quantities of ﬁrm j’s opponents.
Let Fj be the set of members of ﬁrm j. Each ﬁrm j = 1,2,3 is viewed as a team
of members ij ∈ Fj choosing eﬀort levels eij. For all treatments, qj =
P
ij∈Fj eij. That
is, the quantity of each ﬁrm is the sum of its members’ eﬀorts. The four treatments
diﬀer in their model of the internal organization of the ﬁrm. In particular the incentive
structure varies across treatments. However, parameters were chosen such that there is
1Three ﬁrms are chosen rather than two in order to avoid collusion which is observable in some
two-ﬁrm Cournot games (Huck, Normann, and Oechssler, 2004).
3a behavioral equivalence between ﬁrms and single decision makers (see Table 1).
Treatment C
Treatment C is a (C)ontrol-treatment with a standard 3-ﬁrm symmetric Cournot oligopoly.
Each ﬁrm corresponds to a single member (i.e., a unitary player) such that each member’s
eﬀort corresponds to a ﬁrm’s quantity. The payoﬀ function of each subject is simply the
proﬁt function of his ﬁrm (equation (2)).
Treatment SP
Treatment SP is a treatment with (S)ymmetric ﬁrm-size and (P)roportional incentives.
Each ﬁrm has three members, i.e., Fj = {1j,2j,3j}, for all ﬁrms j = 1,2,3. Every
member faces identical linear costs of eﬀorts k(eij) = 831
6eji, that are chosen such to
yield a behavioral equivalence between individuals in treatment C and teams in this
treatment (see below). Moreover, every member is entitled to a share of his ﬁrm’s proﬁt
that is proportional to his eﬀort level. That is, the payoﬀ function of each member








Note that treatment SP is equivalent to a standard nine-ﬁrm Cournot Oligopoly with
marginal cost k+c. In this sense, the treatment allows us also to test whether the framing
of three players each as a ﬁrm inﬂuences behavior.
Treatment SH
Treatment SH is a treatment with (S)ymmetric ﬁrm-size and an allocation of proﬁts per
(H)ead. The treatment is analog to treatment SP except for the distribution of ﬁrm-
proﬁts and eﬀort costs. Eﬀort costs k(eij) = 0 are nil, such that we obtain a behavioral
equivalence between individuals in treatment C and teams in this treatment (see below).








That is, proﬁts of the ﬁrm are allocated per head and independent of the member’s eﬀort.
Note that in this treatment (as well as in treatment AH below) any distribution of
eﬀorts among members adding up to the Cournot Nash equilibrium quantity of the ﬁrm
is a Nash equilibrium. Thus this treatment allows us to investigate the impact of an
intra-ﬁrm coordination problem on the quantity of the ﬁrm and the market outcome. In
comparison with treatment SP, we can evaluate the eﬀect of two diﬀerent rules of proﬁt
distribution among members of a ﬁrm. Again, we have a behavioral equivalence between
single-player ﬁrms and team-ﬁrms.
Treatment AH
Treatment AH is a treatment with (A)symmetric ﬁrm-size and an allocation of proﬁts
per (H)ead. The treatment is analog to treatment SH except for the sizes of the ﬁrms.
Firm 1 consists just of a single member, whose eﬀort corresponds to the quantity of ﬁrm
1. Firm 2 and 3 have three members each as in the treatments before. Consequently,
the payoﬀ functions for each member diﬀer depending on whether the member is in ﬁrm








πj(qj,q−j),j = 2,3. (6)
This treatment with asymmetric team size allows us to study the eﬀect of team-size on
competition. Together with treatment SH, treatment AH enables us to analyze ﬁrst,
whether individuals behave diﬀerently towards team-ﬁrms than towards other individual
ﬁrms, second, whether team-ﬁrms behave diﬀerently in markets with individual ﬁrms
than in markets with other team ﬁrms only, and third, whether the number of members
5per ﬁrm has any inﬂuence on results.
Table 1 provides an overview of prominent outcomes such as the Nash equilibrium,
the collusive outcome and the competitive outcome, revealing the theoretical behavioral
equivalence between those treatments. The calculation is standard and thus omitted.
Note again, that in treatment SH and AH there is a continuum of Nash equilibrium
eﬀorts since every distribution of eﬀorts over members of a ﬁrm that sums up to the
Nash equilibrium quantity of the ﬁrm is a Nash equilibrium eﬀort level. Thus players
face a co-ordination problem in each ﬁrm with more than one player. The table reports
just the symmetric Nash equilibrium eﬀort level. Note further, that due to the individual
eﬀort costs in treatment SP, the collusive and the competitive level from the individual’s
view diﬀers from those corresponding levels from the ﬁrm’s view. Thus the behavioral
equivalence between treatment SP and C is restricted to the Cournot Nash equilibrium.
Based on previous Cournot experiments in the literature, the game in each of our
treatments was played repeatedly for 40 rounds with ﬁxed matching in order to enable
subjects to learn. Each subject had to choose his eﬀort level from the grid {0,0.1,0.2,...,x},
whereby x was ﬁxed at 1500 in treatment SP, SH and AH (for subjects in three-member
ﬁrms) and at 4500 in treatment C and AH (for subjects in single-member ﬁrms). The
grid was chosen such to make all prominent outcomes feasible and allow also for the
monopoly outcome. Between the rounds, each subject received feedback information on
his own eﬀort and proﬁt, the total eﬀort of all other members in his ﬁrm (only treatment
SP, SH, and for team-ﬁrms in treatment AH) and the total quantity of all other ﬁrms
in the previous period. Note that this information is suﬃcient for myopic best-reply
learning.
Each session consisted of three stages: the brieﬁng stage, the interaction-stage, and
the debrieﬁng stage. Stages 2 and 3 were programmed in the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
1999). In the brieﬁng stage, subjects received written instructions that were read aloud
by the experimenter. In the appendix we include as an example an English translation
6Table 1: Behavioral equivalence across treatments
treatments
outcomes SP SH AH C
Nash equilibrium
ind. eﬀort 249.5 249.5a 249.5a,b / 748.5c 748.5
ﬁrm quantity 748.5 748.5 748.5 748.5
market quantity 2245.5 2245.5 2245.5 2245.5
collusive outcome
ind. eﬀort 1661




a,b / 499c 499
ﬁrm quantity 499 / 415.83d 499 499 499
market quantity 1497 / 1247.5d 1497 1497 1497
competitive outcome
ind. eﬀort 3322




a,b / 998c 998
ﬁrm quantity 998 / 831.67d 998 998 998
market quantity 2994 / 2495d 2994 2994 2994
a symmetric outcome
b eﬀort of a member in three-member ﬁrm
c eﬀort of a member in the single-member ﬁrm
d from the individual’s point of view
of the instructions for treatment SP, which we consider the most complex instruction
among all treatments. The instructions describe the game as well as the details of the
session. The game was indeed framed as competition among ﬁrms as presented in this
article. The demand function, costs functions, eﬀort costs, proﬁt-distribution and team-
sizes were public knowledge. Moreover, all subjects knew what feedback they would
receive after each round. The appendix provides an example of a screen-shoot. Such an
example was also presented and explained to subjects in the instructions. Subjects were
encouraged to ask questions about the instructions, which some did. Answers were given
publicly. After the instructions, an example was computed in front of the subjects by
the experimenter to enhance the subjects’ understanding of the incentives. After that,
7each subject had to take a simple test that required the calculation of ﬁrm-proﬁts and
member-payoﬀs.2 Subjects had a standard calculator available. Only after all subjects
successfully completed the test, the interaction-stage was started. The exchange rate
from the experimental currency Taler to EURO was announced in the instructions. It
varied between 2500 to 400 Taler per Euro-cent depending on treatment and type of ﬁrm.
Moreover, since losses are possible, each subject received a lumpsum payment upfront,
which was also announced in the instructions.
In the interaction stage, subjects had to play the game repeatedly for 40 rounds. To
support their decision, they had three diﬀerent “trial”-calculators available (see screen-
shoot in the appendix). It was understood from the instructions that the inputs in
those calculations have no inﬂuence on their payoﬀ from the experiment. First, there
was a calculator (2a) that automatically computed the member’s payoﬀ if he inserted a
number each for his own eﬀort, the total eﬀort by other members of the team and the
total quantity of opponent-ﬁrms (the “trial calculator”).3 Second, there was a calculator
(2b) that automatically computed the member’s best response and proﬁt if he inserted
a number each for the total eﬀort by other members of the team and the total quantity
of opponent-ﬁrms (the “best-reply calculator”). Subjects could try out as much as they
wanted and the computed payoﬀs were listed below the calculators respectively. Those
lists were automatically deleted after each round. However, all entries to the calculators
have been recorded by the experimenter automatically. Third, there was a standard
calculator on the computer available. After all subjects in the session had chosen and
conﬁrmed their eﬀort levels, payoﬀs were computed automatically and the next round
was started. After each round subjects received feedback information (see above), which
was displayed at the top of the next period’s screen.
The debrieﬁng stage consisted of a computerized questionnaire that asked for the
2The example values did not correspond to any prominent value in the game. There was also no
evidence that subjects started out with the values of the example.
3The input ﬁelds of the calculator was adjusted to the diﬀerent treatments.
8following information: major, term, gender, whether the subject participated in a lecture
on game theory, and how the participant would summarize his behavior. At the end of
the questionnaire the ﬁnal payoﬀ converted in EURO was announced to the subject. The
exchange rates were announced previously in the instructions. Final payoﬀs were paid
immediately after the session concluded.
Beside the obvious treatment variables discussed above, there are other variables that
could inﬂuence the experimental outcome, but which we ﬁxed throughout the experiment.
For instance, we do not study the inﬂuence of information on the behavior of ﬁrms. We
are aware that diﬀerent information may lead to diﬀerent learning behavior and outcomes
(see for example Huck, Normann and Oechssler, 1999, 2000). Since we do not want to
study how subjects master the degree of computational complexity involved in playing
optimally, we provided them with the three diﬀerent calculators discussed above. We also
decided to use the framing as “ﬁrms”, “market” etc. since it is standard in the literature
on Cournot experiments (see Huck, 2002).
Finally, we need to mention that losses were possible. Thus subjects could possibly
become bankrupt even with the initial lumpsum payment upfront. Indeed, this occurred
in a few cases in the early rounds of the experiment in treatment SP. In such cases we
bilaterally agreed with those subjects on a loan such that they could continue with the
experiment.
3 Hypotheses
The aim of this article is to test the unitary player assumption in the Cournot oligopoly.
Our design allows us to test the following hypotheses. Note that each market is an
independent observation.
Hypothesis 1 Total outputs of markets do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly across treatments.
9Hypothesis 2 Total outputs of markets do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from total Cournot
Nash equilibrium output.
Hypothesis 3 Team-ﬁrms do not behave signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in markets with individ-
ual ﬁrms than in markets with other team ﬁrms only. I.e., outputs of team-ﬁrms in
treatment SH are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from outputs of team-ﬁrms in treatment AH.
Hypothesis 4 Individual ﬁrms do not behave signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in markets with
team-ﬁrms than in markets with other individual ﬁrms only. I.e., outputs of individ-
ual ﬁrms in treatment AH are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to outputs of individual ﬁrms in
treatment C.
Above hypotheses summarize what one associates with the unitary player assumptions
in our framework. That is, one may be conﬁdent with the unitary player assumption in
the Cournot oligopoly if above hypotheses are not rejected.
Above hypotheses concern the average behavior in the experiment. We do not expect
that subjects choose exact equilibrium eﬀorts over all 40 periods. Rather, our design
allows subjects to learn using a (sequential) best-reply process. Indeed, since the game
in each treatment has a potential function4, one can show that sequential myopic best-
reply converges to the Nash equilibrium in ﬁnite time (see Monderer and Shapley, 1996).
Hypothesis 5 Individual eﬀorts, ﬁrms’ quantities and market quantities converge to
Nash equilibrium levels.
Apart from the above hypotheses we would like to analyze the following issues. First,
how is the co-ordination problem in treatments SH and AH reﬂected in the data? Do
4To see this, note that according to Monderer and Shapley (1996) a Cournot oligopoly with linear
demand and costs has a potential function. Notice that treatment SP is equivalent to a 9-ﬁrm Cournot
oligopoly with linear costs c + k. Finally, note that treatment SH and AH is equivalent to a 3-person
Cournot games except for the a ﬁxed factor ]F
−1
j in ﬁrm j’s proﬁt function. This factor, however, causes
no problem for the existence of an ordinal potential.
10subjects manage to select an equilibrium or are they unable to co-ordinate on one of
them? Second, our design allows subjects to follow a (sequential) best-reply process
converging to the Cournot Nash equilibrium. We would like to check whether this is
indeed the case. Third, we would like to relate the calculator inputs to the individual
quantities. Do subjects choose an eﬀort that they calculated beforehand? Are subjects’
“beliefs” about opponents correct in the sense that opponents behave as assumed in their
previous calculations? Do subjects search for best or better replies?
4 Results
The experiment was conducted in the Bonn Laboratory of Experimental Economics in
May 2003. For each treatment we generated 6 independent observations. In total 168
subjects participated in our experiments. According to answers to the questionnaire at
the end of the experiment, about 58% of the subjects majored in economics, 23% in law,
5% in languages and the rest in history, communication, political science etc. About
62% of the subjects were undergraduates (3 years maximum). 16% of the subjects where
above the 8th semester. The sex ratio was almost balanced with about 49% female
subjects. About 19% of the subjects announced that they had previously discussed game
theory in a course. We could not ﬁnd any focal correlation between the results and the
subjects’ characteristics
Each session took about 2 to 21
2 hours including brieﬁng and debrieﬁng. The payoﬀ
to each student was about 18 Euro on average.
4.1 Market Quantities
Figure 1 presents the average market quantities per treatment across the 40 periods. A
ﬁrst glance suggests that average market quantities are very similar across treatments.
Average market quantities are slightly larger in treatments SH and AH. Figure 1 also re-
11veals that market quantities are distributed closely around the Cournot Nash equilibrium
market quantity.
Figure 1: Average market quantities
Table 2 provides the summary statistic for market quantities per treatment. Treat-
ments SH and AH have slightly higher average market quantities than treatments SP
and C. The latter two have also smaller standard errors. The Cournot Nash equilibrium
is in all treatments the best predictor compared with the competitive outcome and the
collusive outcome. However, treatments SP and C deviate less from the Cournot Nash
equilibrium prediction than treatments SH and AH.
Figure 2 displays the market quantities for each of the six markets per treatment
across the 40 periods of the experiments. Again, there are no visible diﬀerences across
treatments. The market quantities are distributed around the Cournot Nash equilibrium
market quantities.
12Figure 2: Market quantities per treatment
13Table 2: Summary statistic of market quantities across treatments
treatments
SP SH AH C
average 2224.74 2324.37 2369.05 2243.06
standard error 292.24 396.80 510.10 306.34
st. err. to Nash equ. 290.94 427.96 522.80 306.46
st. err. to competitive out. 825.50 / 397.94a 782.11 843.19 813.40
st. err. to collusion 789.62 / 1024.20a 918.57 1020.00 813.29
a from the individual’s view
The behavioral equivalence is indeed conﬁrmed for treatment SP and SH by the two-
sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test and the Robust Rank Order Test (see Siegel and
Castellan, 1988)5, in which we compared the average market quantities of SP and SH
with the ones of treatment C. For the two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test we can
not reject Hypothesis 1 even at the 0.29 level for treatment SP and SH, and at the 0.045
level for treatment AH (always compared to treatment C). For the Robust Rank-Order
Test, we can not reject Hypothesis 1 for treatment SP and SH at the 0.1 level and
for treatment AH at the 0.05 level. The lower signiﬁcance levels for treatment AH are
probably due to a few periods of extreme outliers in two observations of AH. If we omit
these two observations and compare the 4 remaining average market quantities of AH
with the ones of C we cannot reject a behavioral equivalence even at the 0.1 signiﬁcance
levels.
The Nash equilibrium prediction is conﬁrmed by a two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov
5The two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whtiney Test indicates whether samples from two populations have
the same distribution without presupposing the direction of eventual diﬀerences. In contrast, the Robust
Rank-Order Test is concerned with the medians of those two samples without assuming that they are
sampled from the same distribution. Note that 0.1 is the highest signiﬁcance level in Siegel and Castellan
(1988) for this test.
14One-Sample Test (see Siegel and Castellan, 1988).6 Rejection of the null-hypothesis was
not possible even at the 0.2 signiﬁcance level.
So far, the observations of market quantities are summarized as follows:
Observation 1 Total output of markets do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly across treatments C,
SP, and SH. I.e., for these treatments we can not reject Hypothesis 1. For treatment AH
signiﬁcance levels are lower than in treatment SH and SH.
Observation 2 Total output of markets do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from the total Cournot
Nash equilibrium output. I.e., we can not reject Hypothesis 2.
From Table 2 we know that standard errors in treatment SH and AH are higher than
in treatment SP and C. Indeed, judging by the Figures 1 and 2, the volatility seems to
be higher in treatment SH and AH than in SP and C. This is probably due to the co-
ordination problem subjects faced within each ﬁrm in those treatments. Recall that there
are many individual Nash equilibrium eﬀorts all adding to the ﬁrm’s Nash equilibrium
quantity. Figure 2 may also suggest that the volatility does not decrease and perhaps
even increases in treatment SH and AH. However, in treatments SH, AH, and C there is
only one market each where the standard error is higher in the last 20 periods than in
the ﬁrst 20 periods. In treatment SP there is no market with increased standard error in
the last 20 periods.
Observation 3 Standard errors are higher in treatments SH and AH, which is probably
due to the co-ordination problem faced by the individuals in each ﬁrm. There is no
substantial evidence that standard errors increase over the 40 periods.
6The two-sided Kolmogorov-Smirnov One-Sample Test is concerned with the goodness-of-ﬁt between
the distribution of a set of sample values and some theoretical distribution. It evaluates whether the
sample values could have come from the same theoretical distribution.
154.2 Individuals and Firms
We want to test whether team-ﬁrms behave signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in markets with in-
dividual ﬁrms than in markets with other team-ﬁrms only. Notice that treatment AH
is more similar to treatment SH than treatment SP or C. Hence we compare data from
team-ﬁrms in treatment AH to team-ﬁrms in treatment SH instead SP or C. Since we
have three (two) team-ﬁrms per market in treatment SH (AH), we randomly select one
from each market in order to get six independent observations from each treatment. The
signiﬁcance level is 0.47 for the two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test and rejection is
not possible at the 0.1 level for the Robust Rank-Order Test. Clearly, we can not ﬁnd
any signiﬁcant diﬀerence.
We also want to test whether individual ﬁrms behave signiﬁcantly diﬀerent towards
team-ﬁrms than towards other individual ﬁrms. To test this, we consider data from
individual ﬁrms in treatment AH and compare these to quantities of individual ﬁrms in
treatment C. Whereas in each market of treatment AH we have a single individual ﬁrm
(playing with two other team ﬁrms), in treatment C we have three individual ﬁrms in each
market. Thus in treatment C we randomly select for the test one of the three individual
ﬁrms in each market. Thus, for treatment AH and C, we have six independent observation
each, which we test for whether they diﬀer signiﬁcantly or not. The signiﬁcance level is
0.35 for the two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test and rejection is not possible at 0.1
level for the Robust Rank Order Test. Again, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence.
Observation 4 Team-ﬁrms do not behave signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in markets with individ-
ual ﬁrms than in markets with other team ﬁrms only. I.e., we can not reject Hypothesis 3.
Observation 5 Individual ﬁrms do not behave signiﬁcantly diﬀerent in markets with
team-ﬁrms than in markets with other individual ﬁrms only. I.e., we can not reject
Hypothesis 4.
In treatments SH and AH the standard errors of the ﬁrm quantities and individual
16Table 3: Standard error of ﬁrm quantities and individual eﬀorts
treatment ind. eﬀort ﬁrm’s quantity
SP 79.44 149.35
SH 121.67 201.27
AH 191.08b 204.13a / 264.72b
C - 162.37
a only 1-player ﬁrms
b only 3-player ﬁrms
eﬀorts are higher than in treatments SP and C (Table 3). Interestingly, in treatment
AH the standard deviation of subjects in three-player ﬁrms (191.08) is almost as high as
the standard deviation of subjects in one-player ﬁrms (204.13). Again, this is probably
due to the co-ordination problem that subjects faced in treatment SH and AH. Moreover,
standard errors for team-ﬁrms in treatment AH are higher than standard errors for team-
ﬁrms in treatment SH. The latter are at about the same magnitude as standard errors
of individual ﬁrms in treatment AH. It appears that the heterogeneity of ﬁrm size in
treatment AH increases the standard error of quantities of team-ﬁrms.
Standard errors do not decrease during the 40 rounds for a substantial portion of
subjects and ﬁrms. I.e., standard errors for the last 20 rounds are higher for a sizeable
portion of individual ﬁrms and team-ﬁrms across treatments, especially in treatments SH
and AH (about 30% of individual ﬁrms and about 20% of team ﬁrms).
Observation 6 The standard errors of ﬁrms’ quantities and individuals’ eﬀorts are
higher in treatments SH and AH than in treatments SP and C, which is probably due
to the co-ordination problem. The standard errors in those treatments do not decrease in
the last 20 periods of the experiment for a substantial proportion of individuals and ﬁrms.
Our data on individual eﬀorts/quantities suggest some behavioral heterogeniety among
subjects. A way of capturing this heterogeniety is by constructing diﬀerent types of sub-
17Table 4: Types of players
SP SH AH C
aggr. ind. 16.7% 25.9% 25.0% -
def. ind. 11.1% 35.2% 27.8% -
aggr. ﬁrms 5.6% 11.1% 2.8%a / 0.0%b 5.6%
def. ﬁrms 5.6% 16.7% 2.8%a / 0.0%b 5.6%
a only in 3-player ﬁrms
b only in 1-player ﬁrms
jects. We distinguish between aggressive and defensive subjects and ﬁrms. We say a
subject (ﬁrm) is aggressive if 60% of the periods he plays at least 50 (100) grid-points
above the Nash equilibrium level. Similarly, a subject (ﬁrm) is defensive if 60% of the
periods he plays at last 50 (100) grid-points below the Nash equilibrium level. Table 4
reveals the distribution of types across treatments. For individual eﬀorts, treatment SH
and AH have a higher percentage of extreme types compared to SP. Note that in those
treatments there were also asymmetric equilibria involving asymmetric levels of eﬀorts
across individuals within the same ﬁrm. Similarly, treatment SH has more extreme ﬁrms
compared to SP, AH, and C. There is not much diﬀerence among the latter three treat-
ments in terms of the distribution of types of ﬁrms. Remarkably, the percentage of
defensive and aggressive types of ﬁrms is almost equal in each treatment.
Observation 7 Treatments SH and AH lead to more asymmetry among individual eﬀort
levels as compared to treatment SP. This is in line with the existence of asymmetric Nash
equilibria in treatments SH and AH.
4.3 Convergence and Learning
We say that a time series of a variable converges to the Nash equilibrium level if in the
last 20 rounds a higher percentage of cases is within a range of +/ − δ around the Nash
18Table 5: Percentage of cases within the interval around symmetric Nash equilibrium
treatment ind. eﬀorts ﬁrms’ quantities market quantities
SP 29.8% / 36.8% 39.2% / 52.5% 31.7% / 54.2%
SH 13.9% / 15.0% 26.7% / 42.5% 23.3% / 27.5%
AH 12.9% / 11.7%a 31.9% / 45.6% 20.0% / 34.2%
C - 45.8% / 57.8% 33.3% / 45.0%
a 3-player ﬁrm
ﬁrst 20 rounds /last 20 rounds
equilibrium level than in the ﬁrst 20 rounds. We ﬁx δ at 30, 80, and 100 grid-points for
the individual eﬀorts, the ﬁrm quantities and the market quantities respectively.
In Table 5 we report the percentage of cases which do belong to the interval in the ﬁrst
and second 20 periods of the experiment. In almost all treatments (except the individual
eﬀorts in treatment AH) a larger percentage of cases lies within the interval in the last
20 periods of the experiment compared to the ﬁrst 20 periods. Whereas about 50% of
ﬁrm quantities and market quantities lie in the interval for treatments SP and C, this
is lower in treatments SH and AH. Percentages for individual values are lower than for
ﬁrm and market quantities probably due to an averaging eﬀect.
According to Hypothesis 5, individual eﬀorts, ﬁrm quantities and market quantities
should converge to the Nash equilibrium levels in all treatments. Indeed, our design
allowed subjects to learn the respective equilibrium levels using a myopic sequential
best-reply process. However, there is only weak evidence for myopic best-reply learning
across treatment. Figure 3 shows the mean square deviation between each subject’s best-
reply and the actual eﬀort choice per period per treatment. Although the mean square
deviation declines over 40 periods, it is still substantial at the end of the 40 rounds.
Observation 8 There is only weak evidence for myopic best-reply learning and conver-
gence to Nash equilibrium levels.
19Figure 3: Mean square deviation between best-reply and individual eﬀorts









































One feature of our experimental design is the collection of data calculated by subjects.
On average each individual made about 70 calculations with any of the two calculators
during the experiment. This is about 1.75 calculations per head and per period. Thus
subjects spent eﬀorts to solve the interactive decision problem. In about 38.3% of all
calculations, subjects used the trail calculator, whereas 61.7% of the time the best-reply
calculator was used. These proportions did not vary much across treatments. The best-
reply calculator was used more often than the trial calculator in all treatments.
The four charts in Figure 4 provide information about the use of calculators. The
upper left chart shows the average number of calculations per head over all 40 periods.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































21after the tenth period. It appears that treatment C required less calculations than the
other treatments. The chart in the lower left corner answers the question about the
percentage of individuals that played a decision previously calculated. It starts with
50% to 70% and seems to fall below 50% (in treatment SH even to about 20%). We do
not know the subject’s motivation for their calculations. However, the upper right chart
indicates that only about half of the subjects used their calculations for checking the
result of the previous period. Thus it is unlikely that they consciously used some myopic
best-response adjustment process. Finally, the lower right graph shows that only a small
fraction of individuals used at least one variable that also appeared in the subsequent
period. This fraction does not increase over the 40 periods. If we assume that subjects
try out what they believe opponents will do, then the graph indicates that subjects were
unable to correctly anticipate the decisions of others and did not learn to anticipate
other’s decisions.
The time taken for decisions per period decreased from about 200 seconds at the
beginning to about 50 seconds after the 10th period, and to about 30 seconds at the end.
Almost across all periods these decision times were slightly higher in treatment SH and
AH compared to treatments SP and C.
5 Conclusions
In Cournot competition, the decision making by ﬁrms is modeled as if the decision of
the ﬁrm is done by a single decision maker (treatment C). This entails the unitary player
assumptions. To provide a theoretical justiﬁcation, we introduce simple team structures
for each ﬁrm (treatments SP, SH, and AH) that lead to the same results as if the decisions
of a ﬁrm are done by single decision maker. We test the unitary player assumption
experimentally and ﬁnd support for it on the level of market quantities even if members
of a ﬁrm face a co-ordination problem within the ﬁrm (treatments SH and AH). That is,
average market quantities does not diﬀer signiﬁcantly across treatments. The size of the
22team has no inﬂuence on the output of the ﬁrm and opponents.
A Translation of Instructions Treatment SP
Welcome to the experiment!
In this experiment you can earn money by making decisions. Your earnings will depend on
your decisions as well as the decisions of the other participants. Please read the instructions
carefully. All participants received the same instructions. From now on please do not talk to
other participants anymore. For any questions please do not hesitate to contact us.
You will draw shortly a random number. With this number you will remain anonymous for
us and other participants during the experiment. Please proceed to the cabin in the laboratory
with the same number.
Firms
When arriving at your cabin, you will be matched automatically and randomly with other
participants into a ﬁrm without knowing the other participants. In every ﬁrm there are 3
members (except you there are two other members in your ﬁrm). Each market consist of 3
ﬁrms (except your ﬁrm there are two other ﬁrms in your market). The experiment consists of
40 periods which are followed by a questionnaire. The matching of the participants in ﬁrms
remains the same throughout the 40 periods. Moreover, there are always the same ﬁrms in
a market. In each period each ﬁrm sells a quantity in the market. The costs to the ﬁrm are
1 Taler per quantity. The price per quantity depends on your ﬁrm quantity as well as the
quantities of the other two ﬁrms in your market. The higher the quantities in the market, the








total quantity of all
ﬁrms in the market

or 0
The proﬁt per quantity is the proﬁt of the ﬁrm per quantity. It is calculated as follows:






The proﬁt of the ﬁrm per period is simply the proﬁt per quantity multiplied with the quantity
of the ﬁrm:
proﬁt of the ﬁrm = proﬁt per quantity × quantity of the ﬁrm
Your decision
In each period each participant has to take a decision about his eﬀort spent in the ﬁrm. The
eﬀort can lie between 0 and 1250 (in steps to 0.1). The costs to each participant per eﬀort is
23831
3 Taler. The sum of all eﬀorts over all participants within a ﬁrm is the quantity of the ﬁrm,
which the ﬁrm sells in the market.
quantity of the ﬁrm = sum of eﬀorts of all members within the ﬁrm






sum of eﬀorts of all members
× ﬁrm proﬁt
The costs of eﬀort is calculated from the costs per eﬀort of 831




= costs per eﬀort × own eﬀort
The payoﬀ to a participants per period is calculated as follows:
payoﬀ = share on the ﬁrm proﬁt − cost of eﬀort
Computer
We use the computer for the input of the decisions, for trying out of decisions and for the
calculation of payoﬀs. Latter is done automatically. At the beginning of each period you can
see the following screen (top left in the corner you can ﬁnd the number of the period):
(1) Values of the previous period
To your information you ﬁnd the values of the previous period at the screen. They are nil in
the ﬁrst period.
(2) Support for Calculations
Second, there are two calculators for trying out of decisions, which you can use. The input into
the calculators do not inﬂuence your payoﬀs. The calculator left (2a) calculates the payoﬀ (g)
if you put in your possible eﬀort (e), your belief about the eﬀorts of the other members in your
ﬁrm (a) as well as your belief about the quantities of the other ﬁrms (A). After the input, the
input data will be listed together with the calculated payoﬀ under the calculator if you press
the “calculate” button with the mouse. The eﬀorts of the other members in your ﬁrm (a) is
calculated as follows:
eﬀort of other
members of the ﬁrm (a)
= sum of eﬀorts of all other members of the ﬁrm
24The quantity of the other ﬁrms (A) is
quantity of other
ﬁrms (A)
= sum of quantities of the other two ﬁrms
= sum of eﬀorts of all members of the other two ﬁrms
The calculator to the right side (2b) calculates your optimal own eﬀort (e∗) and your optimal
payoﬀ (g∗) if you input your belief about the eﬀorts of the other members of the your ﬁrm
(a) as well as your belief about the quantities of the other ﬁrms (A). The optimal own eﬀort
(e∗) is the eﬀort which maximizes your payoﬀ in this period if the other members of your ﬁrm
and the other ﬁrms behave as input by you. Your calculations are listed under the calculator
after you press the “calculate” button with the mouse. At the right side below the calcula-
tor there is also a button. If you press this button a standard calculator appears on your screen.
(3) Your decision
In (3) you have to choose your eﬀort level. In contrast to the calculators, this input will inﬂuence
your payoﬀ as outlined above. Only after you pressed “OK”, your decision will be conﬁrmed
25and the experiments proceeds with the next period. After 40 periods a questionnaire appears
at the screen, which we ask you kindly to ﬁll in.
Your ﬁnal payoﬀ
Since in this experiment there can be losses in a period, you will receive at the beginning an
initial balance of 60 000 Taler. For your ﬁnal payoﬀ we calculate the sum of your initial balance
plus the sum of payoﬀs of all periods. This payoﬀ in Taler will be exchanged into EURO
using an exchange rate of 400 Taler = 1 Cent. This will be paid to you immediately after the
experiment.
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